The ECCploit paper by Lucian Cojocar won the Distinguished Practical Paper Award at IEEE Security & Privacy 2019.
After a long embargo period of 9 months we made our paper RIDL: Rogue In-Flight Data Load available to the general public. RIDL introduces a new class of speculative execution attacks that can leak any “in-flight” data available in the CPU.
More information (including some nice demo videos) are available at https://mdsattacks.com. We have also released a tool that you can use to see how vulnerable your computer is to different speculative execution attacks.
On the 12th of March, Herbert provided his view on the NatWest pilot of authorizing payments by means of fingerprints instead of PIN on BNR (Business News Radio). Many thanks to VUSec Slack chat for the long discussion on this topic 😉
VUSec researcher Pietro Frigo won the Code Blue Young Researcher Award and because he is now rich, he promises to buy us all drinks for the remainder of his Ph.D. The corresponding paper (“Grand Pwning Unit“) shows how to use the GPU to boost microarchitectural attacks (such as cache side channels and Rowhammer). Here is a picture of the lucky winner:
Best paper award for Andrei at RAID 2018.
This year, TLBleed will be presented at Blackhat USA. TLBleed is a new side channel attack that exploits the TLB rather than CPU caches to infer activity from a co-resident hyperthread, the full details of which we have not yet released.
Hope to see you in Vegas!
Network infrastructure attacks are a growing threat, and are addressed by a budding VUSec research project.
KPN recently published the fifth European Cyber Security Perspectives – edition 2018. It features an article detailing an early version of an active research project of VUsec, called Packet Origin Fidelity (POF), a detection method of network infrastructure attacks.
We analyzed the election software that is used, and has been used for years, in all Dutch elections. Our conclusion: this software is very vulnerable.
On the 13th of March, Herbert Bos appeared on RTL Nieuws to summarize these findings. He is on briefly after 7 seconds, and then again at 3m17s (also with Sebastian, Marco and Sanjay, who did the heavy lifting for the analysis, together with Andrei).
Surprisingly, Minister Ollongren does not think there is a problem, even though we show vulnerabilities as bad as integer overflows that allow attackers to manipulate overall results even from compromised local polling stations.
The news broadcast, our analysis, and the independent analysis by Sijmen Ruwhof, did lead to questions from the parliament, and some members of parliament explicitly echoed Herbert’s analysis. The issue was also reported in most newspapers and on Tweakers.